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ACQUIESCENCE, OBJECTION AND THE DEATH 
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DAVID J. BEDERMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati have offered1 a carefully argued and 
nuanced approach to a central dilemma in international legal theory: once 
constituted, can customary international law (“CIL”) norms ever be 
supplanted? As tempting as it might be to weigh-in on the intellectual and 
doctrinal history of what Bradley and Gulati refer to as the “Mandatory 
View”—that States may not unilaterally withdraw from CIL rules once 
such rules are formed2—my contribution here focuses on two, related 
claims made by Bradley and Gulati and their normative implications. 
Bradley and Gulati’s first claim has to do with a crucial feature of the birth 
of CIL: the ability of States as persistent objectors to block the formation of 
custom. The second claim refutes the possibility that, once birthed, CIL 
cannot—under the Mandatory View—ever really die. Both these claims 
require further elaboration and qualification. 
I. PERSISTENT OBJECTION 
Bradley and Gulati’s first claim is that there is an apparent disconnect 
in international legal theory which allows States to unilaterally opt-out of 
the formation of a rule as CIL, but, once “crystalized,” that norm cannot be 
subsequently violated. This is known as the “persistent objector” rule. 
Bradley and Gulati ask whether the rule was really intended to be an 
exception to the Mandatory View and thus whether the rule has obscured 
the possibility that international actors have, in fact, embraced a “Default 
 
 * K.H. Gyr Professor of Private International Law, Emory University. This contribution is 
partially drawn from chapter 11 of my forthcoming book, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). I profited from participation in the Duke Law School Center for International 
and Comparative Law Scholarly Roundtable on “Opting Out of Customary International Law,” held on 
January 30, 2010. 
 1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202 (2010). 
 2. See id. at 204-05 (describing the “Mandatory View”), 215-26 (discussing historical support for 
the Mandatory View). 
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View,” allowing States to opt-out of a CIL norm with sufficient notice and 
expectation safeguards.3 In large measure this debate turns on the proper 
reading of a number of canonical decisions issued by the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the mid-twentieth century.4 This was just the 
time (Bradley and Gulati argue5) that the Mandatory View was stealthily 
supplanting the Default View. 
The first of these, The Asylum Case,6 implicated a most peculiar 
custom. The case arose when a Peruvian military leader, Victor Raul Haya 
de la Torre, took refuge in the Colombian embassy in Lima after leading an 
unsuccessful coup attempt. Elsewhere in the world, this would have 
resulted in a very long stay for Haya de la Torre. For while all nations 
respect the inviolability of foreign embassy premises, there is certainly no 
rule requiring a host State to allow a political refugee safe passage out of 
the embassy, out of the country, and to the asylum State. Nowhere, that is, 
except Latin America, where there evolved a regional custom of diplomatic 
asylum. 
Imagine, then, the surprise of the Colombian authorities, who, after 
waiting a few months, made what they assumed was a pro forma request to 
Peru to grant Haya de la Torre safe passage to Colombia. The Peruvians 
turned them down, asserting that they were not bound by the regional 
custom of diplomatic asylum. The Court ultimately took Peru’s side in the 
dispute, ruling that the regional custom was not binding.7 Once it became 
clear that Colombia bore the burden of showing that Peru’s conduct 
violated international law (as opposed to Peru being required to explain its 
actions), the result was inevitable. 
The most significant aspects of this case were the ICJ’s treatment of a 
State’s reaction as proof of its opposition to the formation of a custom and 
its discounting of regional custom as a source of international law. The 
Court ruled that where a regional (as distinct from a global) custom was 
concerned, silence on the part of the State in the face of an emerging 
practice meant that that State objected or protested to the rule. A silent or 
ambiguous response meant rejection. This ran counter to the general 
 
 3. See id. at 232, 239-41. 
 4. See id. at 233-34 (discussing the Asylum and Fisheries cases). 
 5. See id. at 233. 
 6. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20). 
 7. See Herbert W. Briggs, The Colombian-Peruvian Case and Proof of Customary International 
Law, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 728–731 (1951); ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-54 (1971); SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, The DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 374-77, 380 (1958); H.W.A. THIRLWAY, 
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 100-03, 136-37 (1972). 
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presumption in international law that States were obliged to protest loud 
and often if they wished to avoid being bound by a rule of emerging global 
custom. 
Why, then, did the World Court change the calculus of consent for 
regional custom in the Asylum Case? One can only conclude that the Court 
wished to suppress regional custom, and the Court found that there was no 
more effective way to do so than to declare a presumption that 
fundamentally disrupts the formation of such regional practices. While the 
ICJ has no qualms about applying rules derived from regional (or at least 
non-global) treaties, it was concerned that the development of distinctive 
bodies of regional rules—perhaps not just for Latin America, but also for 
Europe, Africa and Asia—might unduly interfere with the universal 
aspirations of international law. The World Court was worried such easy-
to-make rules would significantly diminish its power. This is evident in 
light of an analytically similar case, Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 
decided by the Court in 1960,8 the ICJ reached a very different conclusion. 
The problem raised in that dispute was Portugal’s asserted right to 
transit both civil administrators, troops and munitions from the Portuguese 
colony of Goa (on the coast of India) to little Portuguese-controlled 
enclaves in India’s interior. This dispute arose in the late 1950s—a critical 
time for the process of decolonization around the world—and India did not 
hide its desire to drive the last vestiges of colonialism from the Indian 
subcontinent. The Indian authorities denied Portugal’s right of passage, 
assuming (correctly) that if the enclaves could not be re-supplied, they 
would be ripe for the picking. 
The ICJ could have decided the dispute as a matter of global custom: 
whether there was some inherent right of passage by one nation over the 
territory of another, especially in situations where one nation’s territory 
completely surrounded another’s. The Court declined to undertake this 
analysis, however, and one can hardly blame them. Such an analysis would 
have been a daunting and difficult task; it would have required collecting 
many centuries of State practice over many continents, in order to derive a 
set of global customary rules for these situations. 
Instead, the World Court chose to limit the scope of the analysis to an 
exceedingly narrow shutter. The ICJ decided to tackle the question of 
whether Portugal and India (and its predecessors, the British and Maratha 
rulers) had developed a special, or local, custom allowing Portuguese right 
of passage. The Court sifted through evidence of the course of dealing 
between the two sides over the course of many centuries. The ICJ 
 
 8. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12). 
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ultimately concluded that Portugal’s right of passage for civil 
administrators was binding custom on India, although India retained the 
right to suspend such passage in exceptional circumstances. But as for a 
right to move troops and weapons over Indian territory, previous 
permissions to do so had been “mere” comity or courtesy, and in so lacking 
opinio juris it failed as a custom.9 
In Right of Passage and its 1952 Nationals in Morocco opinion,10 the 
Court essentially decided that it was futile to declare a global custom in a 
case where it was easier to describe and characterize an ongoing practice 
between the two disputing parties. And, in using a special custom—which 
can be analogized to commercial usages and “course of dealing”—the 
Court resorted to the typical presumption that silence in the face of an 
emerging practice means acquiescence or acceptance. In these bilateral 
situations, it appears especially incumbent on States to protest if they are 
unhappy with the legal positions taken by their neighbors. 
For example, in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,11 the 
United Kingdom and Norway contested access to fisheries off the 
Norwegian coast. Norway had attempted to claim ocean areas through 
some creative cartography: by drawing “straight baselines” from points 
along its rugged coastline and asserting that the enclosed areas were 
exclusive Norwegian fisheries. Norway’s zealous “bidding” of a straight-
baseline rule, combined with Britain’s lack of effective (and well-
documented) protests in the early-1900s, meant that Britain had waived its 
subsequent objection.12 The Court indicated that Norway’s straight-baseline 
rule was thus not “opposable” by the U.K. 
If one regards this pattern of ICJ rulings about the formation of 
customary international law as troublesome (as Bradley and Gulati do13), 
one would be correct to be concerned—but not for the reasons that Bradley 
and Gulati express. The persistent objector cases do appear to support, at 
least implicitly, the existence of the Mandatory View. It would seem that, 
with the exception of regional custom, fortune favors those States that 
aggressively stake-out new rules and hope that other nations simply do not 
notice or fail to act in a timely or compelling manner. Why else have a 
 
 9. See D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 256–58; THIRLWAY, supra note 7, at 138–39. 
 10. Right of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (U.S. v. Fr.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 199–200 
(Aug. 27) (specifically referring to “local custom”). See also D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 254-55; 
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at 388-92; THIRLWAY, supra note 7, at 92-94. 
 11. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18). 
 12. See D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 258–62; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at 368-70; I.C. 
MACGIBBON, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 134 (1957). 
 13. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 232, 237-41. 
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persistent objector rule, other than as a signaling device that the time for 
unilateral opposition to a CIL norm has passed? Despite criticism, the 
persistent objector rule is likely to remain a robust feature in the 
development of CIL. 
II. IS INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM IMMORTAL? 
That leaves the question of how States can effectively “opt-out,” or 
block the application of a customary rule. While the formation of 
customary obligations can be foiled by a lack of duration or consensus in 
State practice, or the occasional denial of opinio juris, once a usage has 
gained momentum it is hard to stop. The general presumption is that, unless 
a State has persistently objected during the process of crystalizing a 
customary norm, it will be held to that rule, even if it later regrets or 
denounces the norm in question.14 Indeed, Bradley and Gulati go so far as 
to assert that “[t]he only way for nations to change a rule of CIL (as 
opposed to overriding it by treaty) is to violate the rule and hope that other 
nations accept the new practice.”15 
I call this the “Walking Dead View” of CIL, and it is perhaps the 
decisive feature of the customary regime in international law. It means that 
States are obliged to protest loud and often if they wish to avoid being 
bound by a norm of emerging global custom. Subsequent objections to an 
already-formed custom are likely to be ineffective, and the only way for a 
State to liberate itself from a CIL obligation is to demonstrate that that 
norm has been superseded or entered desuetude.16 But it is worth observing 
that, with the exception of the acquiescence of coordinate branches of 
government in constitutional separation-of-powers disputes, in no other 
 
 14. Compare Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of 
Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1985) (“the persistent objector rule has no 
legitimate basis in the international legal system”), with Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of 
Customary International Law, 272 RECUEILS DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DROIT INT’L [Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law] [hereinafter RCADI] 155, 227–44 (1998-II) 
(arguing that the persistent objector rule has substantial authority from international precedents) and 
Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of Persistent Objection in 
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457 (1985). See also BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 229-42 (2010). For the origins 
of the persistent objector rule in academic literature, see Olufemi Elias, Some Remarks on the Persistent 
Objector Rule in Customary International Law, 1991 DENNING L.J. 37 (tracing it to the writings of Ian 
Brownlie). 
 15. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 212. 
 16. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 63 (CIL “cannot 
. . . be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any [State] in its own 
favour”). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 
170-71 (2005); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 36–37 (rev. 2d 
ed. 1997). 
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domain of customary law is persistent objection, by a particular actor in a 
legal community, entertained as a ground for refusing to enforce a 
custom.17 Public international law thus has two peculiar features for 
customary norms: they may be objected to by a vociferous minority, but, 
once acceded to, they may not (apparently) be breached, except in the 
absence of a new rule. 
The structure of customary law is thus skewed in favor of rule 
formation, at least once a threshold has been crossed. Persistent objection 
can thus be difficult to sustain.18 As the International Law Association has 
reported, the persistent objector rule 
respects States’ sovereignty and protects them from having new law 
imposed on them against their will by a majority; but at the same time, 
if the support for the new rule is sufficiently widespread, the convoy of 
the law’s progressive development can move forward without having 
to wait for the slowest vessel.19 
Tribunals will occasionally allow States to silently abstain from a 
usage (or to substitute another rule). If other interested nations themselves 
fail to object, this lack of “opposability” might have the same effect as a 
successful persistent objection.20 But this is a strategy fraught with risk, and 
the dynamic of tacit acceptance and persistent objection best describes the 
formation of CIL. 
All this leads to broader—and even more intractable—problems of 
how a norm of CIL, once formed, later is modified or terminated in 
application or effect. Put simply, how can there be desuetudo for custom 
(consuetudo)?21 One myth—perpetuated by Bradley and Gulati—is that, 
once born, a norm of customary international law can never die.22 But this 
 
 17. See also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449, 511-12 (2000). 
 18. See KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67 (2d rev. ed. 1993). 
 19. Int’l Law Ass’n, Committee on Formation of Customary International Law, Statement of 
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law: Report of the Sixty-
Ninth Conference, London, Section II.C.15, Comment (c) (July 25-29, 2000). 
 20. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18) (the 
delimitation rule “would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway, in as much as she has always 
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast”). See also Michael Akehurst, Custom as a 
Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 23–27 (1974–75); G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-
MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 109-13 (1993). 
 21. See E. Jiménez de Aréchega, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RCADI 1, 
21 (1978-I); D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 239-40. 
 22. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 212; see also G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1983). 
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is “a wholly erroneous belief,”23 and it is refuted in State practice. Custom 
does evolve over time. The opposite line of argument is that every act 
contrary to an existing custom “contains the seeds of a new legality,” and 
that “each deviation contains the seeds of a new rule.”24 Indeed, the ICJ in 
the 1986 Nicaragua Judgment seemed to sanction this approach. It 
observed that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a particular 
customary norm could be treated not only as “breaches” of the rule, but 
also “indications of the recognition of a new rule.”25 In this Freudian 
construct, every aberrant usage really is a “bid” for a new custom. But 
sometimes a violation of a CIL norm is just that—an unlawful act that does 
not really purport to establish a new rule.26 Similarly, it surely cannot be 
enough for States to unilaterally declare that a custom is no longer real or 
binding.27 
To unwind an existing custom, it must no longer be constituted by its 
essential ingredients—there must be a contrary State practice, and the old 
norm must no longer be supported by opinio juris.28 This more nuanced 
stance also has support in the Nicaragua Judgment, when the Court noted 
that “[r]eliance by a state on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to 
the principle might, if shared in principle by other states, tend towards a 
modification of customary international law.”29 This may, however, beg the 
question whether “a lack of state practice consistent with [a norm,] rather 
than directly contrary practice”30 triggers desuetude for a custom. There is a 
split among publicists as to whether, in order to complete the process of 
desuetude, the old custom must be entirely supplanted by a new one. Some 
authorities insist this must be so, if for no other reason than to avoid 
lacunae in CIL.31 But others argue that “the evidence of the absence of 
general consensus in respect of a customary rule causes its disappearance 
even before the replacing customary rule has matured.”32 
 
 23. Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 531 (2004). 
 24. VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 99 n.379. 
 25. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27). 
 26. See WOLFKE, supra note 18, at 65–66. 
 27. See Akehurst, supra note 20, at 8. 
 28. See VILLIGER, supra note 16, at 55. 
 29. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 207. 
 30. LEPARD, supra note 14, at 279 (original emphasis). 
 31. See Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Elements of Custom and the Hague Court, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 810, 846 (1971) (F.R.G.). 
 32. Aréchaga, supra note 21, at 21; see also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 
I.C.J. 116, 148 (Dec. 18) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez) (“[A] new case strongly stated may be 
sufficient to render obsolete an ancient custom.”). 
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Despite these disagreements, one can accept the notion that existing 
customs should not be lightly discarded. Indeed, there should be a higher 
threshold of uniformity, consistency and volume of State practice in order 
to terminate “an old, well-settled customary rule,”33 as opposed to creating 
a new one in a hitherto unregulated realm of international relations. 
One can be agnostic in regard to these questions, but still believe, as 
Judge Jiménez de Aréchega noted in his separate opinion in the 1982 
Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, that it cannot be enough to subvert 
an existing custom by vague or inchoate statements34—“in order to have 
this abrogating effect the new rule must necessarily partake of the nature of 
a rule of customary law . . . . Only a legal rule may abrogate a preexisting 
one.”35 This statement was clearly intended as a complement to Kelsen’s 
assertion that “[i]f a substantial number of states repeatedly and effectively 
violate a rule of custom, and particularly do so with the conviction that they 
are creating new law, it is difficult to maintain that the old law remains 
unimpaired.”36 
For an existing custom to enter desuetude, patterns of State practice 
really must change or there must be very clear evidence that the usage is no 
longer “accepted as law.” Put another way, there are two ways to kill a 
norm of customary international law: divert the course of State practice, or 
deprive the rule of its legitimacy via opinio juris.37 Unlike Bradley and 
Gulati, I strongly believe that CIL can and should evolve, and that, by no 
means, are CIL rules immortal. 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING CUSTOM 
To their immense credit, Professors Bradley and Gulati confine their 
analysis of the problem of withdrawal from CIL to a prescriptive antidote 
rather than a broad attack on the very nature of international custom itself.38 
This is just as well, because of all the contemporary challenges to 
customary international law, the line of inquiry which suggests that CIL 
can never be a “real” source of international legal obligation can be most 
 
 33. WOLFKE, supra note 18, at 65. 
 34. See Akehurst, supra note 20, at 8 (explaining that CIL can be altered simply “by repeatedly 
declaring that the old rule no longer exists”). 
 35. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 115 (Feb. 24) (separate opinion of Judge 
Aréchaga). 
 36. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 454 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 
1966). 
 37. But see VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 101 (arguing that only changes in opinio juris can 
effectuate modifications of CIL). 
 38. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 208 (“[O]ur goal is not to challenge CIL’s legitimacy, 
but rather to better understand how it should work.”). 
BEDERMAN_FMT3.DOC 1/7/2011  1:30:38 PM 
2010] THE DEATH OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 
readily dispensed with. Although most recently popularized in the work of 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner,39 this critique of CIL obviously has, as its 
intellectual roots,40 Hans Kelsen’s and H.L.A. Hart’s two-edged attack on 
international law. Kelsen and Hart famously argued that, to the extent that 
custom plays any role in international legal obligation, it is a sign of a 
“premature” legal order,41 and, even worse, a thinly-disguised natural law 
vision based on inchoate notions of “international morality.”42 CIL really 
is, however, an intensely positivist construct. It is far from being a 
“subordinate”43 source of international legal obligation and actually quite 
central to current doctrinal debates. 
Goldsmith and Posner take a very different methodological tack, but 
their provisional conclusion is still the same as Kelsen’s and Hart’s:44 that 
States have no real obligation to follow CIL rules. Using rational choice 
and game theory approaches,45 Goldsmith and Posner posit four models of 
behavioral compliance with customary international law norms: 
coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, and coordination. 
Coincidence occurs when States follow a norm irrespective of the behavior 
of other nations.46 Coercion occurs when strong States force weak nations 
to comply.47 Cooperation and coordination occur when States, out of pure 
self-interest and the expectation of reciprocity, observe a rule.48 In none of 
these situations, Goldsmith and Posner assert, do States follow such norms 
according to a sense of legal obligation.49 To some degree, Bradley and 
Gulati share this view.50 
The flaw in this contention is not so much the game-theoretic 
perspective (which may well describe the dynamic of some State 
 
 39. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-28 
(2005). 
 40. For an intellectual history, see D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 23-29; LEPARD, supra note 14, at 
14-15, 99-100. 
 41. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 44–47 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d 
ed. 1994); KELSEN, supra note 36, at 440–43. 
 42. See HART, supra note 41, at 219–32; see also KELSEN, supra note 36, at 444-45. 
 43. HART, supra note 41, at 45. 
 44. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 225-26. 
 45. See id. at 26–27. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 560-
67 (2002). 
 46. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 27-28. 
 47. See id. at 28–29. 
 48. See id. at 29–35 (distinguishing “cooperation” as a bilateral, “single-play” Prisoner’s Dilemma 
from “coordination” as multilateral, “repeated-play” scenarios). 
 49. See id. at 39. 
50. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 210-11. 
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behaviors),51 but its fundamental assumption as to why States obey 
international law.52 Using a hyperactively realist perspective of 
international relations,53 Goldsmith and Posner conclude that 
“[m]ainstream international law scholars would not view a behavioral 
regularity that arises from” their four models “as an example of customary 
international law.”54 For Goldsmith and Posner, to follow a CIL norm 
because of its inherent value (coincidence), or out of self-interest 
(cooperation and coordination), or even because of fear of negative 
consequences (coercion), is inimical with it being a legal rule. 
That conclusion ignores the rich experience of functional cooperation 
in the international community. Whether one views functionalism in the 
sense of expected reciprocities for behavior, or through a wider lens, one 
must realize that while a State’s compliance with a norm may begin with 
expectation, apathy, or (even) fear, it ultimately ends with the certainty of 
legal duty. Functional cooperation between States and international actors 
is conditioned largely by forces that may have little to do with law. These 
forces might include: developments in the international economy; 
movements of people, goods and services; and the globalization of culture 
and intellectual life.55 The phenomenon of functional legal cooperation 
between States has been overwhelmingly responsive or reactionary. 
International law has acknowledged the demands of international life, 
rather than anticipating or directing them. That is not entirely a bad 
circumstance; some of the signal failings of international law have arisen 
when lawyers and diplomats have moved ahead of the needs of the 
international community. International law is doctrinally most vulnerable—
and most illegitimate—when it loses touch with its constituencies and 
function. Therefore, Goldsmith’s and Posner’s belief that a schism should 
exist between the “true” motivations of States in obeying CIL and their 
sense of legal obligation is no criticism at all. Put another way, one can be 
instrumental about the role of CIL in international relations,56 without 
 
 51. For a review of the game theoretic implications of Goldsmith’s and Posner’s work, see 
generally George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 541 (2005); Swaine, supra note 45, at 573–88. 
 52. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599 (1997); Swaine, supra note 45, at 588-92. 
 53. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1823, 1875-76 (2002). 
 54. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 38. 
 55. For more on these phenomena, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
 56. Goldsmith and Posner refer to theirs as an “instrumental theory.” See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, 
supra note 39, at 185. 
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falling into the realist trap that disclaims any proof of norm-compliance as 
evidence of an international legal obligation. 
However, just because customary international law easily escapes the 
clutches of the realist critique does not make it immune from other charges. 
Standard accounts of customary law—including CIL—laud its efficiency 
and nimbleness in incorporating into a legal system the actual behaviors 
and expectations of that system’s constituents. Custom remains a powerful, 
if subliminal, source of law, even in “mature” legal systems. But public 
international law is not a fully mature legal system at all—aspects of it 
remain strikingly primitive, though only in the sense that public 
international is highly decentralized and institutionally undeveloped, not 
ineffective or unsophisticated).57 Furthermore, customary international law 
is supposedly a source of signal strength and flexibility for international 
law.58 It allows international legal actors to informally develop rules of 
behavior, without the necessity of resorting to more formal and difficult 
means of law-making (like treaties). Custom “tracks” or follows the 
conduct of States, international institutions, transnational business 
organizations, religious and civic groups, individuals involved in 
international matters, and many other actors.59 These functional aspects of 
CIL appear to have been overlooked by Bradley and Gulati. 
Indeed, CIL’s ostensible efficiency appears to have been a primary 
motivation for its incorporation into the ICJ’s Statute Article 38’s 
formulation of the sources of international law. As Baron Descamps, 
President of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, noted in 1920: CIL is “a 
very natural and extremely reliable method of development [of 
international law] since it results entirely from the constant expression of 
the legal convictions and of the needs of the nations in their mutual 
intercourse.”60 But efficiency and “reliab[ility]” may have two very 
different meanings here. The extent to which CIL effectively tracks State 
 
 57. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (2002); see generally A.I.L. 
Campbell, International Law and Primitive Law, 8 O.J.L.S. 169 (1988) and Yoram Dinstein, 
International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1986). 
 58. See R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RCADI 25, 42, 96 (1970) (Neth.); David Fidler, 
Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom, 1996 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 198, 220-24 (describing CIL as 
a “dynamo”); LEPARD, supra note 14, at 371-79; Julius Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law 
Commission, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 21, 32 (1957) (explaining that CIL is superior to codification). 
 59. For the development of CIL by individuals, NGOs, and members of international “civil 
society,” see Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 119 (2007). 
 60. See Baron Descamps, Address Before the Advisory Committee of Jurists (July 2, 1920), in 
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, PROCÈS-
VERBAUX OF THE COMMITTEE, June-July 1920, at 322. 
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behavior (the sense that Descamps employed) is a very different inquiry 
than whether a particular customary norm is rational or reasonable.61 
Some scholars have inferred that CIL is more forgiving in embracing 
unreasonable norms than any realm of domestic law, public or private,62 
where irrational customs are routinely struck by judges. Many of the 
factors that tend towards the promotion of efficient customs are notably 
absent in international relations.63 These are, most particularly, the lack of 
homogeneity among States in the international community and the 
unlikelihood that States will play reciprocal roles on most contentious 
issues. Such a reciprocal relation occurs when international actors find 
themselves routinely on both sides of the problem, such as being both 
buyers and sellers in a commercial transaction. 64 Nevertheless, CIL norms 
are most likely to flourish precisely in the interstices of international 
relations, where States have homogenous objectives and are likely to 
appreciate both sides of an issue in relatively non-contentious 
circumstances.65 While it may well be true that there is no prohibition on 
CIL’s incorporation of irrational norms, such is a highly unlikely 
occurrence.  
The refutation of these critiques of CIL may beg the larger 
implications of the efficiency paradox for CIL. On this issue, Goldsmith’s 
and Posner’s critique hits closer to the mark, and their conclusions are 
amplified by Professors Bradley and Gulati.66 “Multilateral coordination 
problems,” Goldsmith and Posner argue, cannot “easily be solved in the 
informal, unstructured, and decentralized manner typically associated with 
customary international law.”67 This, of course, converts CIL’s supposed 
signal strengths—its informal, unstructured and decentralized character—
into fatal flaws. But in an international legal system which already features 
 
 61. See Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 93, 122–23 (2003); Norman & Trachtman, supra note 51, at 554–55. 
 62. See Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
859, 877-96 (2006). 
 63. Some factors are present, such as the (relatively) small number of States (about 190 today), 
and the likelihood (at least for some issues) of a high number of repeat transactions. See ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 84, 178-81 (1991). 
 64. See id. at 54; Kontorovich, supra note 62, at 893–94. 
 65. See Kontorovich, supra note 62, at 916-17 (discussing CIL of diplomatic privileges and 
immunities as being paradigmatic of this phenomenon), 917-20 (examining laws of war and human 
rights, and concluding that these realms are unlikely to find equilibrium with efficient customs because 
of a lack of reciprocity and mutuality); see also Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by 
Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1373-74 (1997) (explaining that homogenous groups 
use custom as a way to avoid hold-out problems by individuals). 
 66. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 239-46. 
 67. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 37. 
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many highly-structured mechanisms for law-creation (such as functional 
international institutions, the International Law Commission, and treaty-
drafting or treaty-review diplomatic conferences), it certainly makes sense 
that there should also be an alternative set of processes for CIL formation 
The dynamic of State practice and CIL offers the best hope for such an 
alternative to the glacial pace of treaty-making and sclerotic attempts at 
treaty enforcement,68 application, and compliance. 
At a time when customary international law is under attack by both 
extreme positivists (who suggest that its processes are illegitimate and non-
transparent69) and those of a naturalist bent (who regard CIL as merely 
pandering to State interests70), it might be useful to recall that in some ways 
custom is the most positive and progressive of international law sources. 
CIL is certainly the most likely to track (although, I concede, a bit 
inelastically as Bradley and Gulati suggest)71 the actual behavior of 
international actors. The market aspect of customary norm-creation largely 
ensures that. Moreover, as Anthony D’Amato has observed, “[c]ustom is a 
dynamic process of law-creation, yet it is also a restraint on illegal 
dynamism.”72 So, any view of CIL “must provide for change and 
adaptation in customary law, yet it must also ensure enough stability. . . .”73 
Reports of the imminent demise of customary international law, which 
have been circulating for decades,74 thus seem premature. It is highly 
unlikely that the treaty-making process in international law will ever 
 
 68. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 573 
(2005); Bethany Lukitsch Hicks, Treaty Congestion in International Environmental Law: The Need for 
Greater International Coordination, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1643 (1999); Edith Brown Weiss, 
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 
GEO. L.J. 675, 697–702 (1993). 
 69. See N.C.H. Dunbar, The Myth of Customary International Law, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 
(1983); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1113, 1120-39 (1999). 
 70. See Fidler, supra note 58, at 234-48; John Tasioulas, Customary international law and the 
quest for global justice, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 307, 313-20 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine 
& James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007). 
 71. For the academic literature on custom’s “stickiness” or lack of responsiveness of new norms, 
see Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
651 (2006); Victor Flesicher, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 91-92 (2005); see also 
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 245-49. 
 72. D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 12. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See ROBERT JENNINGS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 65–67 
(1986); Kelly, supra note 17, at 537 (any “perceived advantages [of retaining CIL] are not only illusory, 
but are more than offset by significant disadvantages.”); VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 114-16; CHARLES 
DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (P.E. Corbett trans., 1957). 
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completely supplant CIL,75 even though (admittedly) more and more areas 
subject to exclusively customary regulation will be codified over time. 
Furthermore, codification is not an “end of history” for customary 
international law. Codification merely shifts CIL to a new ground of treaty 
construction and application, as well as the potential for new customary 
norms to emerge. 
CONCLUSION 
The crucial challenge for customary international law is to, at once, 
retain its dynamism and its legitimacy.76 As I have tried to argue here, the 
traditional formula for CIL enshrined in ICJ Statute Article 3877 is not a 
musty formalism or some artifact from the deep recesses of international 
law’s intellectual history. Rather, the combined objective and subjective 
inquiries for CIL formation (state practice and opinio juris) remain the 
crucial algorithm for establishing whether a norm really rises to the level of 
international custom, and is thus deserving of recognition and enforcement. 
To dispense with, or relax, either of these requirements, in a misguided 
attempt to increase CIL’s dynamism and relevance (especially to pursue 
favored objectives, such as the promotion of human rights), would fatally 
undermine its legitimacy. Likewise, to abandon customary international 
law’s strong positivist intellectual roots in favor of a new naturalism 
(whether expressed in the idiom of the “rationality” or “humanity” of 
favored norms), would also be folly. 
Within these theoretical limitations, I favor an approach to customary 
international law that emphasizes its diverse and robust (even combative) 
character. The processes of customary international law work best when all 
international actors realize that there is much at stake. That is why I argue 
here for the continued embrace of the tacit acceptance (through 
acquiescence) of emerging CIL norms, so long as the privileged place of 
the persistent objector is recognized. This should apply to manifestations of 
global custom, as well as special or local custom, but not for regional 
custom. Just as we should remove structural impediments to the formation 
of CIL (even while rigorously observing the requirements of State practice 
and opinio juris), symmetry and legitimacy demands that the same process 
should be able to ratchet in reverse. Those norms that have outlived their 
usefulness, and are no longer supported by either constituent ingredient for 
 
 75. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 538-42 (arguing that treaties provide a complete alternative to 
CIL). 
 76. See Fidler, supra note 58, at 220-24. 
 77. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
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CIL, should be accorded a decent burial. If this approach is followed, there 
will be no need to have recourse to Professor Bradley’s and Gulati’s 
proposed “return” to the Default Rule for withdrawing from international 
custom. 
 
